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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Defense Acquisition Programs 
Wednesday, May 16, 2012  
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: Lorna B. Estep, Deputy Director of Logistics, Air Force Materiel Command 
Discussant: Katherine Schinasi, Independent Consultant, former Managing 
Director, U.S. Government Accountability Office 
Basis for a Rational Defense: Acquiring the Right Capability 
J. David Patterson, National Defense Business Institute, The University of 
Tennessee 
Analysis of Alternatives: Keys to Success 
John F. Schank, RAND Corporation 
Lorna B. Estep—Ms.Estep is the deputy director of logistics at the Directorate of Logistics and 
Sustainment, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Ms. 
Estep is a member of the Senior Executive Service. She is responsible for the Materiel Support 
Division of the Supply Management Activity Group, a stock fund with annual sales of $7 billion. She 
directs a wide range of logistics services in support of Air Force managed spare parts, to include 
transformation programs, requirements determination, budgeting, acquisition, provisioning, 
cataloging, distribution and data management policy. She also provides supply chain management 
policy, guidance and direction in support of headquarters, air logistics centers, and U.S. Air Force 
worldwide customers. 
Estep started her career as a Navy logistics management intern. She has directed the Joint 
Center for Flexible Computer Integrated Manufacturing, was the first program manager for Rapid 
Acquisition of Manufactured Parts, and has served as technical director of Information Technology 
Initiatives at the Naval Supply Systems Command. In these positions, she has developed logistics 
programs for the Department of Defense, implemented one of the first integrated and agile data-
driven manufacturing systems, and directed the development of complex technical data systems for 
the Navy. 
Katherine Schinasi—Ms. Schinasi is currently an independent consultant. Until its sunset in 2011, 
Ms. Schinasi was a commissioner with the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, a position she was appointed to by the Senate Majority Leader. The bipartisan 
Commission was established and charged with recommending contract-related improvements in 
contingency environments. Ms. Schinasi continues to provide advice and assistance to Congress on 
implementing the Commission’s recommendations. 
Beginning in 2009, Ms. Schinasi was a senior advisor to The Conference Board, a non-profit 
research firm in New York. As such she was responsible for conducting and commissioning 
academic-level research on 21st century information and communications networks and their impact 
on society and culture. She co-edited The Linked World: How ICT is Transforming Societies, 
Cultures, and Economies and continues to provide assistance to the business community on those 
issues. 
From 1978 until March 2009, she was employed by the Government Accountability Office, 
serving the last six years as managing director for acquisition and sourcing management. Her 
portfolio included operations in the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and 
cross-governmental acquisitions. In her position, Ms. Schinasi testified frequently before 
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congressional committees on topics of defense trade and investment, export controls, the acquisition 
of services and major developmental systems, and the relationship between government and private 
sector businesses. 
She was a frequent lecturer at the Defense Acquisition University, the Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces, and the Naval Postgraduate School. Her team of 180 people, based in five U.S. 
locations, was responsible for recommendations that led to billions of dollars in savings and improved 
government operations, including those involving government-contractor relationships. She was 
appointed to the federal Senior Executive Service in 1998. 
Ms. Schinasi received an MA in international relations from the School of International Service, 
American University, and a BA in government and politics from the University of Maryland. 
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Analysis of Alternatives: Keys to Success 
John F. Schank—Schank (MS, Operations Research, University of Pennsylvania) joined RAND in 
1972. He has been involved in a wide range of analysis that has included industrial base analyses, 
cost analyses, and studies of manpower, personnel, training, and logistics issues at both the Service 
and joint level. He has led or co-led numerous projects for the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence. Among his larger, 
more influential studies were a project on sustaining the U.S. capability to design nuclear submarines, 
which resulted in the addition of more than $9 million to the Navy’s submarine design budget to begin 
work on the next class early; an analysis of alternatives (AoA) on transit of special forces through 
littoral areas; and an AoA on the next-generation sea-based strategic deterrent. His other recent 
studies have dealt with increasing aircraft carrier forward presence, sustaining key skills in the UK 
naval industry, workload- and workforce-management practices in U.S. Navy shipyards, and relating 
littoral combat ship performance to mission package inventories, home ports, and installation sites. 
He has authored or coauthored close to 100 documents for RAND. 
Abstract 
An analysis of alternatives (AoA) is an important step in the acquisition process. It is one of 
the first places where the requirements community and the resource community must come 
together to identify a preferred material solution that can fill a shortfall in desired operational 
capability. AoAs inform Service, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and congressional 
decision-makers on the relative cost effectiveness of viable alternatives that meet the desired 
capabilities. 
Based on conducting several AoAs for the various military Services, RAND has formed a set 
of important considerations when conducting an AoA: 
 develop a thorough study plan that considers a range of alternatives and baselines, 
 form effect relationships with oversight committees; 
 conduct trade-off analyses and examine sensitivities; 
 have a flexible analysis methodology; 
 display results that are easily and quickly understood; and 
 recognize and estimate technical, design, and production risks. 
Introduction 
An analysis of alternatives (AoA) is an important step in the acquisition process. It is 
one of the first places where the requirements community and the resource community must 
come together to identify a preferred materiel solution that can fill a shortfall in desired 
operational capability. AoAs inform Service, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and 
congressional decision-makers on the relative cost effectiveness of viable alternatives that 
meet the desired capabilities. 
AoAs use an objective, systematic, and unbiased process to identify, evaluate, and 
document the costs and mission effectiveness of alternative systems. AoAs help establish 
critical mission characteristics and system performance requirements, and then identify 
potential alternative systems that can satisfy those requirements. An AoA develops an 
analytic framework and methodology to measure the operational performance and total 
costs of each alternative. It then develops appropriate cost-effectiveness measures and 
presents the findings and recommendations to the acquisition executives. 
The objective of this paper is not to describe and define how to conduct an AoA. 
There are numerous sources for that information (e.g., Defense Acquisition University, n.d.; 
Office of Aerospace Studies, Air Force Materiel Command, 2008). Nor is the intent to 
present some new revelations on the conduct of AoAs. Rather, the objective is to coalesce a 
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number of important aspects of AoA execution that are self-evident to us all, but that often 
fall through the cracks during the complex and often time-constrained conduct of the 
analysis. 
The paper describes several important principles that can help contribute to the 
success of an AoA. They are based on insights drawn from several AoAs conducted by 
RAND (Moore, 2004; Kennedy et al., 2006), including those examining the Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV; Schank et al., 2006), Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD; Schank et al. 
2010), the Coast Guard’s Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC; Arena, 2011), and various assets 
under consideration by the Special Operations Command (USSOCOM; DeLuca et al., 2008, 
2009). Success is measured not just by the acceptance of the AoA by the decision 
authorities, but by how thoroughly it identifies alternatives; evaluates the costs, 
effectiveness, and risks of those options; and presents the findings in a way that decision-
makers can understand the trade-offs between operational requirements, system capability, 
and cost. 
The paper is timely since the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently 
criticized the conduct of previous AoAs (GAO, 2009). Based on reviewing over 20 
completed AoAs, the GAO found that many AoAs did not consider a robust range of 
alternatives or adequately consider the cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs. Many 
AoAs did not fully understand the operational requirements and lacked sufficient knowledge 
of available and future technologies. Because knowledge of technologies, design risks, and 
production impacts was lacking, many AoAs based their performance, cost, and schedule 
estimates on optimistic assumptions. Also, the GAO criticized the OSD and the Services for 
not providing adequate guidance on the conduct of AoAs. 
Three Fundamental Questions All AoAs Address 
An AoA basically answers three questions: 
 What are the desired operational capabilities (Do What?) 
 What systems and technologies are or will be available to provide the desired 
capabilities (With What?) 
 What are the costs and performance of the alternatives (How Well)? 
These three questions can be answered through six high-level tasks as shown in 
Figure 1. The first task establishes how the systems will operate and scenarios for 
measuring operational performance. The second task identifies key performance 
parameters (KPPs) and the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and performance (MOPs) 
that will help in the evaluation of the alternatives. In parallel to the first two tasks, Task 3 
identifies viable alternatives that typically combine various platforms and systems, such as 
propulsion or sensors. Tasks 4 and 5 then use the scenarios, MOEs, and MOPs to estimate 
the effectiveness and total costs, respectively, of each alternative. Task 6 combines the cost 
and effectiveness analyses and presents the findings and recommendations to the Service 
and OSD decision authorities. Each basic task is decomposed into several subtasks. 
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Figure 1. Six Tasks Help Address Three Basic Questions 
Most AoAs are conducted in a teaming environment with a lead study director and 
study organizations supported by subject-matter experts in several key areas. For example, 
in the AoAs RAND has conducted, cost and engineering organizations from the Naval Sea 
System Command, other federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), 
and even private-sector organizations have been part of the AoA team.  
The six basic tasks in Figure 1 seem straightforward enough, but there are 
underlying complexities that must be addressed for an AoA to be successful. These include 
the following: 
 develop a thorough study plan that considers a range of alternatives and 
baselines; 
 form effect relationships with oversight committees; 
 conduct trade-off analyses and examine sensitivities; 
 have a flexible analysis methodology; 
 display results that are easily and quickly understood; and 
 recognize and estimate technical, design, and production risks. 
In the following sections, we discuss lessons that we have learned in discussing 
each of these complexities. 
Develop a Thorough Study Plan 
Figure 2 shows that an approved study plan is required before an AoA can start. An 
approved Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) defines the gap in operational capability and 
the requirement for a solution to fill that gap. The ICD may also suggest general alternatives 
that can provide the materiel solution based on functional studies conducted during the 
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Figure 2. AoAs and the Defense Acquisition Process1 
(DAU, n.d.) 
The Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) provides study 
guidance for the AoA. This guidance, along with the ICD, feeds into the development of the 
study plan. 
The study plan provides guidance and objectives for the conduct of the AoA. It is the 
agreement between the AoA study director and the Service and OSD oversight 
organizations on what will be accomplished and how it will be done. The study plan 
identifies 
 the scope of the analysis, the ground rules, and assumptions; 
 the concepts of operation and the scenarios for evaluating mission effectiveness; 
 an initial set of MOEs and MOPs for evaluating mission performance; 
 the broad classes of alternatives and the system trade-offs within alternatives; 
 the range of cost elements for estimating the total cost of each alternative; 
 the roles and responsibilities of the organizations that make up the study team; 
 the responsibilities of the oversight groups; and 
 the schedule and deliverables during the conduct of the AoA. 
The study plan must be thorough, clear, and concise. A good study plan is a 
prerequisite for a successful AoA. Adequate time and resources must be devoted to develop 
the study plan. Guidance and inputs from the subject-matter experts, as well as from the 
Service and OSD oversight organizations, are essential for the development of a study plan 
that will serve as the map—agreed to by all stakeholders—guiding the analysis. 
Form Effective Relationships with Oversight Committees 
Effective relationships with Service and OSD oversight groups are important for the 
AoA study director and study team. Ultimately, the oversight groups must approve the AoA. 
                                                
1 This is Figure 1 from the Defense Acquisition University website. The figure and a nice overview of the 
development and organization of an AoA study plan is at https://acc.dau.mil/ComminityBrowser.aspx?id=314769. 
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These groups will also provide guidance during the AoA and may require the evaluation of 
additional alternatives or trade-offs between system performance and operational 
requirements. 
Critical to the interactions between the AoA study team and the oversight groups is 
the establishment of a steering group. The steering group should provide guidance as 
issues arise as well as access to subject-matter experts and various stakeholders. The 
steering group should work with the study director to approve decisions as analysis 
progresses. 
The steering group should be comprised of representatives from research and 
development centers who can inform the study team of the status of various technologies. 
There should also be representatives from the program office, costs organizations, 
operational commands, and support and logistics groups. The group should have a 
chairperson appointed by the Service or OSD. The study director should meet with the 
steering committee on a monthly basis to discuss issues and potential solutions to those 
issues. 
Again, effective interactions and relationships between the study director and the 
oversight groups are essential for a successful AoA. 
Conduct Trade-Off Analyses 
The primary purpose of an AoA is to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the 
alternatives. However, the AoA should go beyond evaluating basic alternatives. It must 
examine trade-offs between various systems or subsystems and between operational 
requirements and the ultimate costs of meeting those requirements. For example, an AoA 
should address the following questions: 
 How do operational requirements drive system performance? 
 What is the operational impact of relaxing various system requirements? 
 What new technologies (and associated risks) are needed to achieve operational 
goals? 
 How does cost relate to desired mission performance? 
 Which attributes drive costs and risks?  
Figures 3 and 4 show a trade-off analysis that was conducted during the JHSV AoA. 
The alternatives evaluated during that AoA were basically different types of hulls, such as 
mono-hulls, multi-hulled designs, and surface effect ships. But the choice of the propulsion 
system also impacted cost and performance. Figure 3 shows how the choice of a propulsion 
system resulted in different force levels that would be required to deliver a combat force into 
a theater in a given number of days (a duration known as closure time). As shown in the 
figure, diesel propulsion systems needed more vessels for a given closure time compared to 
gas turbine (GT) or combined diesel and gas turbine systems (CODAG). 
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Figure 3. Propulsion System Trade-Off Between Closure Time and Number of 
Vessels 
However, as shown in Figure 4, further analysis showed that the total acquisition 
costs for the force were largely the same across the three types of propulsion systems for a 
given closure time. 
 
Figure 4. Propulsion System Trade-Off Between Closure Time and Acquisition Cost 
Figure 5 shows another trade-off analysis that was informative during the SBSD 
AoA. That AoA had to address not only the type of platform but also the size and number of 
missile tubes. The analysis depicted in Figure 5 identified breakpoints for missile tube 
diameter. For example, for Tomahawk missiles there was no difference in the number of 
missiles that could fit into tubes between 94 and 103 inches in diameter. Since larger tube 
diameters meant bigger hull forms, this trade-off analysis helped define the cost-effective 
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Figure 5. Number of Missiles in Different Diameter Tubes 
Have a Flexible Analysis Methodology 
Things will change during an AoA. New alternatives will be defined. Additional MOEs 
and MOPs will be identified. New scenarios or mission requirements will be added or 
modified. New questions will arise. The original study plan will morph as the AoA 
progresses. Because of these inevitable changes, the AoA must develop a flexible and 
transparent methodology for evaluating effectiveness and estimating costs that can adapt as 
changes arise. This methodology must be understood and approved by the steering and 
oversight groups. Typically, several simple, easily understood models are better than a 
single large, complex model that clouds the relationships between variables. 
Display Results in a Way That is Easily Understandable 
AoAs typically deal with complex issues. Multiple factors and variables surrounding 
operational requirements, system performance, and cost are often interrelated. The AoA 
must capture this complexity yet clearly show the impact of different decisions and choices. 
The charts, graphs, and tables that display results of the analyses are the mechanisms the 
AoA uses to transmit the findings and recommendations. These displays must be easy to 
understand and decipher. 
Figure 6 shows a display that we used in one AoA to show the effectiveness of 
various alternatives in several mission areas. Although no single alternative proved most 
effect in all mission areas, the operational value of alternatives A and B clearly stood out 
when considering the range of missions. 
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Figure 6. Comparing the Effectiveness of Platforms Across Missions 
Table 1 shows another display that related various MOEs and MOPs across the 
various alternatives. Here, alternatives A, E, and G all performed equally well. Finally, Figure 
7 shows a display used to relate life-cycle cost to mission effectiveness for various 
alternatives. In this example, alternatives K and L were shown to be very costly for the 
capability they provided. 
The study director must be creative in putting together the displays that show the 
results of the AoA. Typically, it is better to have several simple charts that build on each 
other rather than a single, complex chart where relationships are not obvious. 







































































Alternative Measures of Effectiveness Measures of Performance
%of TOI 
Prosecuted







A 20% 31% 3 Yes HH60/VUAV
B 15% 27% 2 No* HH65
C 14% 24% ? No HH60/VUAV
D 17% 27% ? No HH60/VUAV
E 20% 31% 2 Yes HH60/VUAV
F 15% 26% 2 No HH65
G 20% 31% 2 SWAP HH60/VUAV
H 18% 29% 2 No HH60
I 18% 29% 2 No HH60
J 18% 29% 2 No HH60
K 18% 29% 3 No HH60
L 18% 29% 2 No HH60
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Figure 7. Comparing Life Cycle Cost to Mission Effectiveness 
Recognize and Estimate Risks 
One of the GAO’s criticisms of previous AoAs was their lack of appreciation for, and 
consideration of, the various risks involved with different alternatives or system solutions. 
Ignoring or underestimating risks can lead to incorrect decisions that result in future cost and 
schedule growth. The AoA must clearly understand and convey the state of various 
technologies, which often requires that the studies be informed by subject-matter experts in 
various fields. While typically associated with technologies, risks can also arise from 
inadequacies in the industrial base, especially in the second-tier vendor base. Risks may 
also arise from other programs the AoA system is dependent upon. For example, although 
the Future Combat System (FCS) for the Army made heroic assumptions on the readiness 
of key technologies needed for program success, it was also dependent on the technologies 
from other programs and made assumptions about the availability of these technologies that 
were not realized. 
Summary Comments 
AoAs are not easy to conduct. There are numerous factors to consider and 
numerous organizations to please. Factors other than those mentioned above that must be 
considered that complicate the analysis include the following: 
 alternatives with unequal service lives, 
 systems of systems, and 
 alternatives with greatly different expenditure profiles. 
In addition to the lessons described above, the AoA must realize there are numerous 
organizations in the approval chain, each with its own ideas and preferences. It is important 
to involve these organizations early in the AoA. It also is important to be prepared for the 
changes and questions that will inevitably arise. 
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